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THE BURGER COURT:
A JUDICIAL NONET PLAYS
THE ENIGMA VARIATIONS*
A. E. DICK HOWARDt
Sir Edward Elgar did not write his "Enigma Variations" for a nonet (nine
players), but the air of mystery surrounding that comparison will be familiar
to students of the judicial process. The various friends whom Elgar portrayed
in his fourteen variations have now been identified, but beyond that the varia-
tions are "based on a theme which the composer said combined in counter-
point with another, unheard tune with which everybody was familiar; but he
refused to the last to divulge the secret."' Elgar would have been quite at
home as an interpreter of the Supreme Court, where counterpoint and un-
heard but familiar tunes are the order of the day.
Complaining about the Supreme Court is a venerable American pastime.
When John Marshall handed down his opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, his im-
placable foe, Spencer Roane, called it "a most monstrous and unexampled de-
cision," which could be accounted for only from "that love of power which all
history informs us infects and corrupts all who possess it and from which
even the upright and eminent judges are not exempt .... ",2
A century and a half later, the conservative columnist James Jackson
Kilpatrick sought to sum up the legacy of the Warren Court. Kilpatrick found
himself walking "a trail of abuses, usurpations, and invasions of power. One
pursues the departed Chief Justice along a littered road of fallen landmarks
and abandoned precedents. Here every principle of jurisprudence lies dis-
carded. It is as if gypsies had passed through, leaving a bad picnic behind. '3
Obviously, the passage of time from the ascendancy of the Marshall Court to
that of the Warren Court had not eased the concern of the Court's critics
about overreaching by the judiciary.
The Warren Court was, of course, a conspicuous target for criticism. The
Court's activism was felt on many fronts-in the quest for racial equality, in
the imposition of a one-person, one-vote rule upon state and national legisla-
tures, in the wholesale decree of greater rights for criminal defendants, to
name a few leading examples. The Warren bench demonstrated again and
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again a willingness to be an engine of social reform. Professor Philip B.
Kurland commented, "If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the
Warren Court has been among the great roadbuilders of all time."'4
The Warren Court seemed charged by a leveling urge. Its egalitarianism
bore fruit not only in race and reapportionment decisions but also in deci-
sions applying the equal protection clause to economic inequalities. A natural
entry into this area lay in criminal justice opinions, in which the Court took
important steps to remove the disadvantages suffered by indigent defendants.
The more innovative justices looked for ways to use the equal protection
clause to strike at other social ills. Justice Douglas was quite candid about the
malleability of that constitutional guarantee. The equal protection clause, he
said, "is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era .... Notions of
what constitutes equal treatment" for equal protection purposes "do change. '5
Coupled with the Warren justices' social philosophy was an abiding suspi-
cion that those wielding official power, such as police and prosecutors, were
apt to abuse that power. Moreover, in tackling such problems, the Warren
Court showed a predeliction for sweeping remedies. Where earlier decisions
might have called for a case-by-case, fact-oriented review of attacks upon state
procedures or practices, the Warren Court was more likely to lay down broad
prophylactic rules. Such decrees assumed the potential for official irregulari-
ties, rather than placing the entire burden upon the challenger to prove, on
the facts of his case, that his constitutional rights had indeed been violated.
An instructive contrast exists in the Vinson Court's 1942 decision in Betts v.
Brady, which required a case-by-case look at attempts to have counsel ap-
pointed for indigent criminal defendants, and Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Warren Court's 1963 decision laying down a flat rule for assuring counsel in
such cases. 6 Gideon was not especially controversial, either on the Court, where
all nine justices agreed to the result, or beyond, where the intrinsic fairness of
the decision commended itself to most observers. Far more provocative, how-
ever, were broad prophylactic rules aimed at police practices in making
searches and seizures of evidence or in conducting interrogations of criminal
suspects. Mapp v. Ohio, applying to the states the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule which had long been applied in federal proceedings, and Miranda
v. Arizona, requiring a set of police warnings before interrogating suspects,
spread consternation among police officials and lay citizens concerned about
rising crime rates. 7
Such activism fueled attacks on the Warren Court and paved the way for
4. Kurland, Earl Warren, The "Warren Court," and the Warren Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353, 357
(1968).
5. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
6. Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
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7. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the Burger Court. Many critics who had no political axes to grind were un-
easy about the Warren Court's techniques. Professors Alexander M. Bickel
and Harry Wellington were disturbed by instances "of the sweeping dogmatic
statement, of the formulation of results .accompanied by little or no effort to
support them in reason, in sum of opinions that do not opine and of per
curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the authori-
ties they cite and the results they decree."'
Outside academic circles, most Americans might not lose much sleep over
the niceties of legal craftmanship and judicial reasoning. But people did care
about how the Court's opinions might affect their lives. In the 1968 presiden-
tial race, Richard M. Nixon capitalized on these concerns. Appealing to "law
and order" sentiments, Nixon complained that the justices were weakening
the country's "peace forces" and giving too much ground to the "criminal
forces." The first civil right of every American, he declared, "is to be free
from domestic violence."'
During his first term as president, Nixon put four justices on the Court.
Rarely has a president been given the opportunity to fill so many vacancies in
so short a time. Moreover, one would search the history books in vain to find
a president who was more explicit in the political philosophy which inspired
his appointments. In nominating Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H.
Rehnquist (filling the third and fourth vacancies), Nixon recalled his cam-
paign pledge "to nominate to the Supreme Court individuals who shared my
judicial philosophy, which is basically a conservative philosophy."' 0
For journalists and other Court watchers, the changing of the guard
carried all the elements of high drama. Pundits quickly coined the name, "the
Nixon Court." In November 1971, U.S. News and World Report concluded that
if the Powell and Rehnquist nominations were approved, "it will be a Nixon
Court, dominated by conservatives."'" With the departures of some of the
great names of the Warren years, notably Hugo Black and John Marshall
Harlan, predictions for the future were often bleak. Some observers foretold
the emergence of a Nixon bloc on the Court, marching in lockstep to undo
the work of the Warren Court. Reviewing the 1971 Term, The New Republic la-
mented that the "single-mindedness of the Nixon team threatens the image of
the Court as an independent institution."'"
A new Supreme Court justice generally goes through a settling-in period,
which may last several years. Usually, one cannot predict from a justice's first
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11. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 1, 1971, at 15.
12. NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 1972, at 8.
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Term what his record is likely to be as he becomes more at home on the
Court. Nevertheless, from the start of the Burger Court there was evidence
that, with the four Nixon appointees on the bench, a new majority was in the
making.
By the end of the 1975 Term, the Burger Court seemed to have come of
age. The closing days of that Term were busy. The cases decided in the final
week reveal the strength of the new tides that were running in the affairs of
the Court. For the first time in forty years, the Court struck down a federal
statute on the ground that Congress had exceeded its commerce powers-a
startling decision to a generation of law professors accustomed to teaching
their students that the tenth amendment was a historical curiosity and that
the commerce clause seemed to know no bounds. 13
Contrasts with the Warren Court abounded in the decisions of those
closing days of the 1975 Term. Continuing a process already underway, the
justices whittled away at the rights of criminal defendants, showing particular
disfavor for fourth amendment claims. In addition to deciding several cases
curtailing the reach of that amendment, the Court closed the doors of federal
courts to large numbers of petitioners by holding that a state prisoner who
has had a full and fair opportunity to raise a fourth amendment question in
the state courts cannot relitigate that question in federal habeas corpus. 4
The contrasts with the sixties embraced equal protection-a favorite of the
Warren era. In one of a number of Burger Court opinions drawing the line on
the so-called "new" equal protection, the Court, upholding a statute man-
dating retirement at age fifty for state police officers, ruled that age is not a
"suspect" classification and therefore that claims of age discrimination do not
require that the state law be subject to strict scrutiny. It was enough that the
statute satisfy the far less demanding standard of minimum rationality.1" Pro-
cedural due process, another growth sector in the Warren years, also fared
poorly, as the justices limited the opportunity for prison inmates to object to
their transfer to other prisons. 16 Another decision at the close of the Term
touched sensitive moral nerves; the Court rejected the argument that capital
punishment is inherently unconstitutional. 1 7
13. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
14. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976) (holding that police search of car impounded for unpaid parking tickets does not vio-
late Fourth Amendment); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that evidence ille-
gally obtained by state police may be used in federal civil proceeding); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that random searches at border checkpoint does not violate
the Fourth Amendment); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that use of busi-
ness records as evidence in criminal trial does not violate Fifth Amendment's protection against
self-incrimination).
15. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
16. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
17. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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As the justices recessed for the summer of 1976, a student of the Court
could begin to sketch a portrait of the Burger Court. By then the Nixon ap-
pointees had served together over four years and distinct patterns had begun
to appear. The Burger Court was proving to be markedly less egalitarian than
the Warren bench had been. In 1966, Justice Douglas had sought to establish
the proposition that classifications found to rest on economic distinctions
should, like those turning on race, be inherently suspect.' 8 The justices of the
seventies were cold to that notion. The 1971 decision in United States v. Kras is
eloquent evidence of the difference in attitudes. Writing for a five-man ma-
jority, Justice Blackmun rejected an indigent petitioner's argument that he
should be allowed to file for bankruptcy without paying $50 in filing fees.
The dissenters were outraged at the idea that some of the poor might find
themselves "too poor even to go bankrupt."19
As of 1976 one might be prepared to identify other earmarks of the
Burger Court. With decisions like National League of Cities, federalism seemedV
to be in vogue once again.20 Where the Warren justices were suspicious of
government power, the Burger Court was showing a willingness to trust the
system, to assume that police officers and other officials generally try to ob-
serve constitutional limitations in performing their duties.2 ' Miranda and the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule were under fire although neither had
been overruled. 22 In general, the Burger Court appeared to be less willing to
supersede the political process in solving social problems. Sensitive to the con-
cerns such as those of Felix Frankfurter about limits on the competence of
judges, justices of the Burger era were openly worrying about how far judges.,
ought to go in second-guessing legislative judgments about issues like the
death penalty or in taking over the administration of nonjudicial functions
such as public education. 23
As of the summer of 1976 a Burger Court observer might conclude, there-
fore, that the era of the Warren Court had drawn to a close, and that an-
other, more conservative, less activist Court had taken its place. Yet he would
be surprised if he tested his conclusions against the record the Court began to
compile in the succeeding Terms. By the close of the seventies, it had become
clear that alongside the trends already described, other forces were at
work-forces having their roots in the activism of the Warren years. By 1980
18. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
19. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 457 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (police); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404 (1972) (juries).
22. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Burger, C. J., concurring
and dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting).
23. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 385-88 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
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it had become far more difficult to draw clean distinctions between the years
of Earl Warren and those of Warren Burger.
Capital punishment cases furnish one example. Some might read the 1976
decision refusing to outlaw the death penalty altogether as evidence of a per-
missive attitude toward state legislation and perhaps as reflecting a law and
order mentality. Yet after 1976 the Court continued, as it had done in previ-
ous terms, to place sharp limits on the power of states to impose capital pun-
ishment. In June 1977, the justices decided two such cases. In one they invali-
dated a state law making the death penalty mandatory for the murder of a
policeman on duty, and in the other they held capital punishment to be dis-
proportionate as the penalty for rape.24 The Court has regulated quite closely
the procedures by which the death penalty is imposed, striking down a num-
ber of statutes in this way. 25 Moreover, the Court has, with the rape case, be-
gun to look at the intrinsic question, no matter how fastidious the procedure,
when is death beyond the state's substantive power to impose. 26 When one
studies the actual opinions in the death penalty cases, one discovers, whatever
the label, a close scrutiny of the verdict of death. These are not cases in which
the justices relax in the face of the exercise of state police power. A state may
have, in light of the 1976 decision, the theoretical power to take away a de-
fendant's life, but in practice the state has to run a tight gantlet to satisfy the
Court. One is reminded of "strict scrutiny" of a kind commonly associated
with the Warren Court's approach to equal protection.
The Court's 1978 Term furnished more examples of activist techniques or
liberal results. After the indecisive splintering of views in the earlier Bakke
case,27 a firm majority formed in Weber to signal that the justices would not
stand in the way of affirmative action to advance blacks in employment. 21 In
cases involving access to the federal courts, the Burger Court has gained a
reputation for making access more difficult, yet in the 1978 Term the justices
seemed to take a more permissive attitude to questions of standing and of ac-
cess generally.2 9 There were eight cases in the 1978 Term which in one way or
another involved claims of sex discrimination, and in six of those eight cases
the justices voted favorably to the claim, either on the merits or on procedural
issues.30 Even in fourth amendment cases-an area in which many liberal crit-
24. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976).
26. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See generally Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death:
Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978).
27. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
28. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
29. Cases such as Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979); and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), reflect a willingness to grant increased
access to the judicial system.
30. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (striking a section of federal law providing
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ics would give the Burger Court the blackest marks-the justices upheld the
fourth amendment claim in six of the ten cases that came before them in
the 1978 Term.
There were, of course, decisions during the 1978 Term in keeping with the
more generally held view of the Burger Court. Once again the talisman of
"no legitimate expectation of privacy" was used to limit the reach of the
fourth amendment-this time in a holding that the installation of a pen reg-
ister to record the telephone numbers one has dialed does not constitute a
fourth amendment search. 2 Editors and reporters, increasingly nervous
about the high court's press rulings, largely were horrified by the Court's
1979 ruling in Gannett that the sixth amendment's "public trial" guarantee
does not mean what the press thought it meant, and by the decision in Herbert
v. Lando that a libel plaintiff could use pretrial discovery to enquire into a tel-
evision producer's thoughts and opinions formed during the editorial pro-
cess. 3 3  Women's groups were outraged when the Court upheld a
Massachusetts veterans preference law which gives absolute preference to vet-
erans in state hiring-in a state where fewer than 2 percent of veterans are
women. 4 And in a series of procedural due process holdings, the Court
showed itself unfavorably disposed to requiring more formal procedures in a
variety of settings, ranging from parole hearings to the voluntary commitment
of minors.
3 5
Small wonder that, in light of such a mixed track record on the part of the
Burger Court, Court-watchers find it difficult to agree on just what this Court
stands for, what the justices' values are, and how best to sum up the Burger
benefits to children only when fathers, but not mothers, were unemployed); Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979) (granting cause of action for violations of due process rights by Congressman
employer); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking down New York statute allowing
unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to block adoption of illegitimate children); Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implying private right of action for violations of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking Alabama
law allowing courts to impose alimony on husbands but not wives); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357 (1979) (striking Missouri law which allowed women a special "optional" exemption). But see
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding veterans preference law);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (upholding Georgia statute precluding illegitimate father
from wrongful death suit on behalf of child, but allowing such suit by mother).
31. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Torres
v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Delaway v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). But see Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Dalia v. United States,
441 U.S. 238 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979).
32. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
33. See Gannett Co. v. Depasquale 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979).
34. See Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
35. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Parham v. J. R. 442 U.S.
584 (1979) (voluntary commitment of minors); Secretary of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania v. In-
stitutional Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979) (voluntary commitment of minors).
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years so far. At the close of the 1978 Term, U.S. News and World Report found
the Court to be "tacking to the left lately on a wide array of issues. '36 A few
months later, an article in The New York Times Magazine painted a different
picture: the Burger Court, it was charged, "has changed little from its early
days" when the Court was generally viewed as a "conservative bench bent on
substantially altering the constitutional jurisprudence on the Warren Court. 3 7
With Warren Burger now into his second decade as Chief Justice, there
are many ways in which one might try to take the measure of the Court's rec-
ord in the post-Warren era. One way would be to assess the Burger Court in
terms of the expectations aroused in the early seventies when Nixon appoint-
ees were taking their seats on the bench. Partly because Nixon aroused such
strong passions, observers were bold to make predictions about the sort of
place the Court would become when the new justices made their presence felt.
I
Expectations of the Burger Court
A. "Nixon" Court
Many feared that a "Nixon Court" would reflect Nixonian policies. "Only
you stand between Richard Nixon and the United States Supreme Court," ran
an advertisement placed by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) in the
New York Times in October 1972. Declaring that "four more years of Richard
Nixon as president" could reduce the nation's judicial bastion of individual
liberty "to rubble," the advertisement urged a vote for George McGovern and
a contribution to the ADA's "Save the Court Committee. 38
Nixon has come and gone, but there is no doubt that his legacy lingers
longest in the judicial branch, both in the Supreme Court and in the vast
number of federal judges whom he appointed to the lower bench. On the
high court, the new directions in judicial doctrine made possible by Nixon's
appointees are most visible in criminal justice decisions. The impulses that
gave birth in the sixties to Mapp's exclusionary rule, to the Miranda decision,
and to other decisions helpful to criminal defendants have been muted. Al-
though the Warren Court's leading criminal justice decisions have not been
overturned, they have often been limited or qualified. As Nixon's attacks on
the Warren Court were concerned above all with its criminal justice decisions,
the trends of the seventies confirm the impact of his appointments.
If, however, by predicting the emergence of a "Nixon Court," the Court-
watcher of the early seventies supposed that across the board the Court's deci-
sions were likely to reflect Nixonian preferences, that notion was a myth from
36. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 16, 1979, at 65.
37. Sidney Zion, A Decade of Constitutional Revision, New York Times, Nov. 11, 1979, Maga-
zine, at 26.
38. New York Times, Oct. 15, 1972, § IV, at 8.
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the start. The history of the Court belies the idea that presidents have had a
high batting average in predicting how their nominees, once on the Court,
would behave. 39 One recalls how Teddy Roosevelt, unhappy with Oliver
Wendell Holmes' performance, growled that he could "carve out of a banana
a judge with more backbone. '40 Harry Truman was unhappy with Tom
Clark; Dwight Eisenhower came to regret his appointment of Earl Warren as
the "biggest damn fool mistake I ever made."'" The record of the Burger
Court confirms the limited reach of a president over justices he has named to
the bench. Burger Court decisions which conflict with Nixon policies include
those vindicating a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, 42 aggressively
rebuffing efforts to channel public aid to church-related schools, 43 curbing
presidential efforts to impound funds appropriated by Congress 4 4 and, of
course, requiring Nixon to hand over the Watergate tapes-a decision which
carried the name of Nixon's own appointee as Chief Justice and agreed to by
his other three nominees. 45 One of the happy lessons gleaned from the rec-
ord of the Burger Court is that while presidents can, in general terms, affect
the direction of the Court, the justices operate with a historic sense of pur-
pose quite free of any feeling of indebtedness to the political forces which
may have put them in black robes in the first place. Indeed, to the discomfort
of presidents from Jefferson to Nixon, the justices advance with fierce pride
the claim first fashioned by John Marshall: that it is "emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"46-a claim en-
larged from a simple argument for the power of judicial review to what many
would call an assertion of judicial supremacy. 47
39. See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO
THE SUPREME COURT 62-63 (1974); 2 C. WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 22
(rev. ed. 1926).
40. See W. HARBAUGH, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 162 (1961).
41. After Clark's opinion in the Steel Seizure Case, Truman called him "that damn fool from
Texas" and "my biggest mistake." Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1973, at 1, quoted in ABRAHAM, op.
cit. supra note 39, at 230n. For Eisenhower's remark about Warren, see J. WEAVER, WARREN: THE
MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 342-43 (1967).
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned Par-
enthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979);
Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). But see Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (cases stating that public funding need
not be made available for nontherapeutic abortions).
43. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). But see Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426
U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971).
44. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
45. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
46. Id. at 703 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
47. See Cooper v. Aaron, 352 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958). See also Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
25(1964).
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B. The Burger Court versus the Warren Court
Another concern some observers voiced, as the Burger Court came into
being, was that it would overturn much of the legacy of the Warren Court. If
the respective Courts' animating spirits be the test, there is much to distin-
guish the two eras, for example, a distinct disenchantment in the seventies
with the headlong egalitarianism manifest in some of the Warren Court opin-
ions. As a result, the Burger Court has often limited or qualified what it in-
herited from its predecessor. Here and there one finds direct overruling. In a
series of cases raising the issue of the application of the first amendment to
picketing and handbilling in privately-owned shopping centers, in 1972 the
Court lamely sought to distinguish a 1968 precedent preferring the rights of
expression to the property rights of the owners of the shopping center. 48 In
1976 the justices went all the way and concluded that the earlier decision had
not survived. 49 Likewise, when Justice Rehnquist wrote National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery in 1976, the view of state sovereignty there expressed brought
down an incompatible 1968 decision, Maryland v. Wirtz.50 There have also
been instances of the Burger Court overruling pre-Warren Court decisions.5 1
For the most part, however, the Burger Court prefers to limit or distin-
guish a precedent, including even those Warren Court decisions found some-
what distasteful. Often the Burger Court will leave the precedent as is but re-
fuse to carry its inherent logic to the next step. Thus, while Miranda has not
been overruled-and is not likely to be-the Court has held that statements
otherwise inadmissible under Miranda may nonetheless be admitted to im-
peach the defendant's testimony should he take the stand.5 2 Likewise, rather
than overturn the Warren Court's 1967 holding that a suspect is entitled to
the presence of counsel at a pretrial police lineup, in a 1972 decision the
Burger Court seized upon the fact that the earlier ruling had involved a post-
indictment lineup. Showing itself to be a master of the fine line, the Court in
the later case refused to apply the requirement of counsel to a situation where
a lineup had been conducted before the defendant had been indicted or other-
wise formally charged.5 3
Significantly, the large body of the Warren Court's work is securely in
place. The landmarks of that Court-school desegregation, legislative reap-
portionment, application of Bill of Rights guarantees to the states by way of
48. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), distinguishing Amalgamated Food Employ-
ees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
49. Hodges v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
50. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976), overruling Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
51. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), overruling Low v. Austin, 13 Wall.
29(1871).
52. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
53. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), distinguishing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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the fourteenth amendment-remain. In school cases, the Burger Court has
rebuffed the efforts of lower courts to provide remedies for de facto segrega-
tion or to require otherwise unoffending suburban school districts to share
the burden of desegregating the central city. 54 Yet where de jure segregation
is proved, the Burger Court has been altogether supportive of federal judges'
power to fashion effective remedies. 55 In legislative reapportionment cases,
the Burger Court has permitted a measure of deviation from mathematical
equality in state legislative districting, but the essential requirement remains
that representation must be based on population. 56
In cases involving "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights, Justice Powell, in
the spirit of the late Justice Harlan, has argued that due process does not re-
quire that all the judicial gloss surrounding a federal guarantee, such as jury
trial, necessarily apply in a state proceeding.5 7 So far, at least, he has failed to
convince a majority of his colleagues to endorse his view.5" It is a striking tes-
timonial to the way in which innovations become accepted doctrine that the
ridicule which Justice Frankfurter heaped upon "incorporation" so recently as
194759 and the even more recent efforts of Justice Harlan 60 have not per-
suaded a Court which cares about federalism (and about punishing crime) to
allow the states freer rein in criminal procedure cases. And it is part of the
evidence that, while the justices of the seventies may have rearranged much
of the furniture, they have not set about redesigning the basic structure in-
herited from the Warren Court.
C. Judicial Activism
As of the early seventies, one might well have predicted that the Burger
Court would not be an "activist" tribunal-that it would be deferential to leg-
islative judgments and to the political process. Activism and a proclivity to
play policy maker had been, after all, among the hallmarks of the Warren
Court, and Richard Nixon seemed bent on seeing the Court foreswear such
bad habits. Moreover, there was evidence that his nominees understood the
54. See Austin Independent School District v. United States 429 U.S. 990, vacating 532 F.2d
380 (5th Cir. 1976); Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
55. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 99
S. Ct. 2971 (1979).
56. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). In congressional reapportionment cases, the
rule of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), requiring mathematical exactness, remains in
force. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
57. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
58. He received the support of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehniquist in Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (Powell, J.) (size of trial jury), and in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28,
40 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (double jeopardy).
59. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J. dissenting); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1978) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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uses of "judicial restraint." At his confirmation hearings before the Senate Ju-
diciary hearing in November 1971, Lewis Powell, in a prepared statement, re-
called the virtues of the canons of restraint urged years before by Louis
Brandeis, and Powell recalled fondly his Harvard Law School professor, Felix
Frankfurter, another figure identified with at least one form of judicial
restraint.
6 1
In the opinions of the Burger Court, there is evidence of a preference, by
at least some of the justices, for leaving difficult social issues to the political
process. In rejecting an attack on the Texas system of financing public schools
through heavy reliance on local property taxes, Justice Powell pointed to state
decisions about raising and disbursing tax revenues as an area in which the
Court "has traditionally deferred to state legislatures." Moreover, Powell ar-
gued against judges, ill informed in education matters, being too ready to in-
terfere with "the informed judgments made at the state and local levels. '62 In
the capital punishment cases, both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
saw a fundamental issue as being the presumption that in a democratic society
courts ought to be slow to strike down legislative judgments. 63 In a third area,
sex discrimination, four justices, in an opinion by Justice Powell, pointed to
the country's being in the process of considering the Equal Rights Amend-
ment as a reason for not going along with Justice Brennan's argument that
gender classifications, like those based on race, should be inherently suspect
and thus give rise to strict scrutiny. 64
Yet, while the Court may have its apostles of restraint, evidence of activism
is legion. Roe v. Wade, holding that liberty as protected by due process of law
includes a woman's right to abortion, is surely a paradigm example. 65 If activ-
ism means to formulate a right not explicitly nor impliedly given constitu-
tional status, it would be hard to find a more activist opinion than Roe. Its au-
thor, of course, was one of the Nixon appointees, Justice Blackmun.
Roe v. Wade is no sport. In the seventies substantive due process, that habit
many folks thought judges had kicked after 1937, became respectable again.
Even in the Warren years, suggestions that a decision might turn on substan-
tive due process were embarassing to the justices. This unease goes a long way
toward explaining Justice Douglas's remarkable "emanations from a penum-
61. See Hearings on Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F. Powell Jr., of
Virginia to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1972). See also Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging
Nixon Majority. 70 MICH. L. REV. 445, 450-51 (1972). Some, notably the late Justice Black, would
argue that the Frankfurter concept of judging was anything but a constraint on the judge's dis-
cretion. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
62. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973).
63. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375, 465 (1972) (opinions of Burger, C. J., and
Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
65. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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bra" opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.66 In 1963, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, Justice
Black thought he had nailed fast the coffin lid of substantive due process. 67
He was mistaken-at least in noneconomic cases. 68 Griswold was simply old-
fashioned substantive due process. So was Roe v. Wade, as Justice Stewart, a
dissenter in Griswold but with the majority in Roe, conceded.6 9 Justice Powell
cast his lot openly with the legitimacy of substantive due process in his opin-
ion in Moore v. East Cleveland, where he extended strict scrutiny to a local or-
dinance impinging on the "extended family." Powell sought to make the use
of substantive due process appear less free-wheeling by offering the "teach-
ings of history" and the "basic values that underlie our society" as guides.70
Such arguments, when made by Justice Frankfurter, had never comforted
Justice Black,7 1 but Black's unbending opposition to substantive due process
has not carried the day. It is interesting that, where the Warren Court had
skirted the technique with evident discomfort, the Burger Court has openly
reestablished substantive due process as a means available to limit governmen-
tal power.
72
Other examples could be supplied. The general conclusion, however, is
clear-the Burger Court is no more a stranger to judicial activism than was
the Warren Court. A majority of the post-Warren justices may from time to
time, as in Rodriguez, forebear to use the judicial tools available to them, but
they have proved in other cases, for example, in Roe, their willingness to use
those tools when the occasion seems inviting.
D. The Court's Business
Recalling how the Warren Court was criticized for finding so many new
things for judges to do, one might have supposed that the Burger Court
would find ways to constrict the breadth and scope of the Court's business-a
variation on the expectation that the Court in the seventies would be less ac-
tivist. Certainly justices who worry about whether judges have the expertise to
run school systems or oversee other public activities might be expected to try
to narrow the categories of cases which will find their way to the Court's
docket.
66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
68. On economic cases, see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 257 (1976), overruling Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
69. 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
71. Compare Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59
(1947), with Black's dissent, 332 U.S. at 68. See Howard, Mr. Justice Black: The Negro Protest Move-
ment and the Rule of Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1030 (1967).
72. In addition to Roe and Moore, see, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (decision whether or not to beget children is a fundamental right); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental).
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There are essentially two ways in which the Court can stay out of areas
with which it would rather not deal. One is the use of avoidance techniques
such as ripeness and mootness: devices which can be used to get rid of a par-
ticular case at bar. The other is to use denials of review, or perhaps summary
affirmances, to make it clear that the Court simply has no interest in a given
class of cases.
The Burger Court has found a number of ways to make it more difficult
for plaintiffs to get into federal courts in the first instance. The justices have
tightened the screws in some (but not all) standing rulings, 73 thrown up obsta-
cles to class action suits,74 created financial barriers by being unsympathetic to
efforts to imply a basis for award of attorneys fees from federal statutes,
75
sharply curtailed opportunities for state criminal defendants to seek federal
habeas corpus, 76 and curbed federal court injunctions against state judicial
proceedings.
77
Once cases reach the Supreme Court, however, justices of the Burger era
appear to have been as inconsistent as their predecessors in using avoidance
techniques to circumvent ruling on the merits of a case on the docket. In
DeFunis, for example, the Court held the case moot because Marco Defunis
was in his final semester in law school and seemed certain to graduate. 78
Thus, with the country poised expectantly for a judicial guidepost to the ex-
plosive issue of racial preferences in higher education, the Court ducked. Yet,
in Roe v. Wade, where by the time the case was heard by the Supreme Court
Ms. Roe had obviously either had a baby or an abortion, the Court slid easily
by the mootness issue, invoking the familiar "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" formula. 79 Again and again, the Court demonstrates how
elastic doctrines such as mootness can be. There is certainly no reason to con-
clude that the Burger Court has sought to use avoidance techniques of what-
ever kind in any more consistent or self-denying fashion than did the Warren
Court.
73. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (suburban zoning). But see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmen-
tal Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), for decisions
easing the standing requirement in environmental cases.
74. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co. 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (requiring each plaintiff in a
class action to have $10,000 in controversy to satisfy federal jurisdictional requirement); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (requiring that individual notice be given to all identifi-
able members of class).
75. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
76. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
77. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). But see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1975); Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
78. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
79. 410 U.S. at 125.
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Avoidance techniques aside, the Court may show its lack of interest in
a category of cases through the Court's pattern of granting and denying review.
The justices have been pointedly selective in determining which kinds of "per-
sonal autonomy" cases they will take. Operating from the doctrinal base of
Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, the Court has woven a web of protec-
tion around a cluster of intimate sexual and familial decisions-to marry, to
beget (or not) a child, to have an abortion, or to divorce.8" Yet the justices
show no interest in other claims raised in the name of "autonomy," for exam-
ple, school dress code and hair cases. Each of ten judicial circuits has decided
school hair cases, and they have divided five-to-five. 8' Despite this classic con-
flict of circuits, the Court has never heard a school hair case,82 nor is it likely
to do so. The justices seem to agree with Justice Black's "don't bother us with
this nonsense" view (expressed in an order denying a stay): "Surely few poli-
cies can be thought of that states are more capable of deciding than the
length of the hair of schoolboys. '"83
Nor, despite all the popular attention to "gay rights," do the justices ap-
pear to have much interest in claims that sexual preferences ought to receive
constitutional protection. When a three-judge federal court in Virginia di-
vided two-to-one in rejecting male homosexuals' challenge to that state's sod-
omy law, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. The Court neither heard
argument nor gave reasons for its decision.8 4 Other efforts to attract the
Court's attention to homosexuality cases-for example, cases in which teachers
sought to prevent being fired because of their sexual preferences-have
failed .85
Looking at the Burger Court's record overall, however, one is struck more
by the new ground it has ploughed than by the terrain it has chosen to ig-
nore. Areas that were rare or untouched in the Warren years have become a
staple of the Court's docket. In the sixties Justice Goldberg sought in vain to
bring up the issue of capital punishment; the Court would not even grant cer-
80. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Carey v. Population Services
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (child begetting); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth 428 U.S.
52 (1976) (abortion); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce). See generally Wilkinson
& White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977).
81. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873, 927 n.293 (1976).
82. The Court has heard and decided a case involving the length of a policeman's hair. The
majority, applying a rationality test, had no trouble upholding the department's regulation
requiring short hair. See Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
83. Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1971) (Black, Circuit J.)
84. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Three justices (Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens) thought the case should be set for oral arguement. See also Ratchford v.
Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari in case where gay
rights organization had won right to use university funds in federal appeals court).
85. See Gaylord v. Takoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash.2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1976); Gish v. Board of Education, 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1976).
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tiorari.8 6 Not only did the Burger Court, in Furman v. Georgia, decide that
capital statutes as then administered were unconstitutional; it has continued to
decide death penalty cases with regularity.
87
Sex discrimination cases have been even more regular fare on the Court's
table. In 1961, the Warren Court easily turned aside constitutional challenges
to a Florida law making jury services for women completely voluntary. 8 Since
that time, the women's movement has become one of the visible facts of the
American scene, and Term after Term the Burger Court has decided a stream
of sex discrimination cases. Sometimes the challenged law is sustained, more
often it is not. The justices have differed on standards, settling in effect for a
kind of intermediate scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Yet whatever
the test, and whatever the result, the simple fact is that sex discrimination
cases-not to mention other cases involving women's rights (such as the abor-
tion cases)-occupy a major part of the Court's attention. 9
What we are witnessing is the "judicialization" or "constitutionalization" of
American life. What blacks accomplished by going to court in the days of the
Civil Rights movement inspired others to emulate their example. Prisoners,
voters victimized by malapportionment, women, juveniles, inmates of mental
institutions-virtually any group or individual failing to get results from the
legislative process or from administrators has turned to the courts for relief.
Emboldened by experience in desegregating schools and reapportioning legis-
latures, federal judges (led by such jurists as Frank Johnson and Skelly Wright)
began to weave remedies for a variety of ills.
The Burger Court might have been expected to call "halt" to the process
of constitutionalization. In some areas, the justices have sought to slow the
process. Rodriguez represents a victory for a hands-off approach to school fi-
nance, and Rizzo v. Goode reflects deep doubts about letting judges in effect
lay down operational rules for police departments.9" But such decisions seem
to be only moments for catching breath in the expansion of areas in which
the judiciary is willing to enquire. The Burger Court may sometimes reach a
"liberal" result, sometimes a "conservative" one. It may sometimes lay a re-
straining hand on federal judges, sometimes be more permissive. All the
while, however, the scope of the Supreme Court's docket expands to include
wider terrain. In constitutional litigation, there appears to be a kind of rachet
effect: once courts get into an area, they rarely depart. Neither does the Su-
86. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963). Justices Brennan and Douglas joined
in Goldberg's dissent from denial of certiorari.
87. See notes 24-26, supra.
88. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
89. In the 1978 Term alone there were the eight cases listed in note 30, supra.
90. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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preme Court depart-no more under Warren Burger than under Earl
Warren.9
Many of the expectations harbored at the outset of the Burger
Court-that it would be a Nixon Court, that it would undo much of the
Warren Court's work, that it would draw back from judicial activism, that it
would constrict the scope and breadth of the Court's business-simply have
not become reality. Still other predictions could be examined, and they, too,
would likely have to be, at the least, revised or heavily qualified. For example,
surely, it was thought, the Burger Court would be a "law and order" court.
To be sure, this Court is more sensitive to the needs of law enforcement than
was the Warren Court. There is ample evidence of shifts in many dimensions
of criminal justice, notably interrogations and search and seizure law. 92 Yet
conclusions about "law and order" mentality would have to be qualified by
noting such decisions as that extending the Gideon right-to-counsel principle
to misdemeanor cases, and the Court's emphatic reaffirmation of the central-
ity of the warrant requirement in fourth amendment cases, surprising those
observers who thought the Court would somehow slide to a reasonableness
standard.
93
Yet another surmise was that the Burger Court would be a "states' rights"
court, a tribunal which would revive federalism. The best evidence bearing
out such an expectation, of course, is National League of Cities v. Usery, a deci-
sion resting squarely on assumptions about state sovereignty. 94 There are, as
well, decisions in which federalism, or the related value of localism, is at least
one of the articulated interests. 95 But save in the rare case like National League
of Cities, references to federalism are commonly mixed with other values, such
as a concern about economy of judicial effort or about finality of litigation.9 6
X More to the point, there is ample evidence that, when it comes to
umpiring the federal system, the Burger Court does not tilt toward the states
and away from federal power. In general there appears to be no tendency to
deny to Congress powers to deal with national problems, however local the
91. On the policy-making role of the courts, see D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POL-
ICY (1977). See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
92. For a slashing attack on the Burger Court's record in criminal justice cases, see L. LEVY,
AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974). For a more moderated view,
see Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1319 (1977). See also Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Process: Direc-
tions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 518 (1977).
93. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in misdeameanor cases).
See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (holding unconstitutional Arizona's "murder
scene exception" to the exclusionary rule).
94. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
95. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 & n.35 (1976).
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impact of the regulation. 97 Similarly, where state laws are attacked as
impinging upon national interests, as in burden on commerce cases, the
Burger Court is no less willing than was the Warren Court to vindicate the
national side of the question.98 Whatever one may say about the frequency
with which the Warren and Burger Courts respectively have intervened to
protect the individual from governmental power generally (state or federal), it
seems to stretch the evidence to conclude that the Burger bench has notably
preferred the states to the federal government.99/
II
Accounting for the Burger Court
In short, one should be slow to put labels on the Burger Court. It remains
to enquire, then, what accounts for the Burger Court's mixed record-for the
ad hoc, episodic quality of the Court's opinions.
The temperament and habits of the justices play a part. It is easy to imag-
ine justices coming to the conference table with "shopping lists," justices who
look over the Court's conference lists with an eye to cases that could become
vehicles for doctrinal initiatives. Some observers no doubt see Justice
Rehnquist as such an ideologue.1 00 For the most part, however, this is not an
accurate picture of how the justices of this Court do their work. Overall, the
present Court is one whose members take the cases as they come. The very
fact that the Court must await a "case" or "controversy" is, of course, a force
that tends to make the Court reactive rather than initiative. It is likely in any
event that the Burger Court justices, by comparison to some of their recent
predecessors, find themselves more comfortable working case by case rather
than by broad directions.
This tendency is reinforced by the Court's workload pressures. More than
one justice, the Chief Justice included, has complained about the burdens
thus placed on the Court.10 1 As of June 1975, it was reported that five justices
had gone on record as favoring the concept of a National Court of Appeals to
ease the Supreme Court's workload.10 2 Justice Douglas, to be sure, did not
think the Court overworked; he reckoned four days a week enough to keep
up with the Court's work.10 3 Other justices, feeling more pressed, are more
97. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCreary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). National League of Cities is, again, the
exceptional case, but even that opinion leaves no doubt about the reach of Congress' power to
use the commerce power to regulate the private sector of the economy. See 426 U.S. at 840.
98. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
99. For a fuller discussion, see Howard, The Supreme Court and Federalism, in RoscoE POUND-/
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE COURTS: THE PENDULUM OF FEDERALISM (Final Re4
port, Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States) 49 (1979).\ I
100. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976).
101. Such complaints have been aired both on and off the bench. See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802, 853 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
102. See Washington Post, June 13, 1975, § A, p. 17, col. 1.
103. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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likely to wrestle with the cases as they arise, lacking the leisure to philosophize
about some grand design of constitutional interpretation.
The Burger Court also lacks the larger than life figures of the Warren
Court, men like Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter, around whom issues
tended to polarize. These were justices who developed a theory of judging.
Through their fully evolved doctrines, they put pressure on their colleagues
to think about cases in doctrinal terms. Even Earl Warren, in some senses so
unscholarly, put an ethical pressure on his brethren, as in facing the issue of
racial segregation in the public schools. Sometimes (as with Frankfurter) the
emphasis was on process, sometimes (as with Douglas) on result. 104 In either
event, issues had a way of emerging as preordained. In judging, as in politics,
ideology has a way of making questions seem clearer and their answers more
foretold.'
0 5
Since the departure of the great ideologues, the justices are under less
pressure to fit individual cases into doctrinal tableaux. No longer preor-
dained, issues are seen to be more complex. Ad hoc results become the order
of the day-a natural consequence when problems refuse to be contained in
the jacket of doctrinal order. Justice Powell came to the Court inclined to
thinking in the pragmatic way of the practicing lawyer, rather than in abstract
doctrine. 10 6 As a justice he has come to be identified with "balancing." Justice
Black's critics used to scorn him as an "absolutist" (he wore the badge
proudly); no one would be likely to hang that label on Justice Powell."0 7 Like-
wise, Justice Stewart is more comfortable with ad hoc judging than with
theory. It is no accident that Powell and Stewart are identified with the cen-
trists on the Court who collectively hold the balance of power in most cases.
All in all, one can argue that the Burger Court is, surprisingly enough, a less
ideological bench than was the Warren Court.
The justices' tendency to ad hoc decisions is reflected in the distaste some
of them show for categorical, per se rules. The Warren Court's fondness for
prophylactic rules, such as Miranda or the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule, is not echoed in the Burger Court. This Court may not have gone so far
as to jettison those prophylactic rules, but the justices leave little doubt that
they are more comfortable with fact oriented adjudication than with broader
formulations.
104. On Justice Frankfurter's concern with process, see the paper he read at a meeting of the
American Philosophical Society in 1954, published in 98 PROCEEDINGS OF AMER. PHIL. Soc'v 223
(1954). As to Douglas, see, e.g., Karst and Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-ins and State Action-Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REV. 762 (1962). Justice Douglas was unabashed in his view
that constitutional law should be rewritten by each generation of justices in order to achieve re-
suits required by the times. See Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949).
105. I am indebted to Professor G. Edward White for helping me sharpen this idea.
106. See Howard, op. cit. supra note 61, at 449.
107. On Black's "absolutism," see W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CON-
FLICT IN THE COURT 13 (1961); Griswold, Absolute Is In The Dark, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 (1963).
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The Burger Court has for some time been characterized by a lack of cohe-
sive voting blocs. On one side are the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist; on
the other, Justices Brennan and Marshall. Between these wings is a floating
middle group. Justice Stevens came to the Court in 1975, and commentators
are still trying to label him (the fact that he is often called the Court's "wild
card" reflects the pundits' inability to do any better). Stewart and White re-
main essentially centrists, Powell is ever the careful (and moderate) craftsman.
As for Blackmun, it has been a long time since anyone has talked about the
"Minnesota Twins." Evidence of the Court's fragmentation may be gleaned
from a look at the voting pattern of the four Nixon appointees. In the 1973
Term, they voted together in over three-fourths of all decided cases, in the
1975 Term nearly as often, but by the 1977 Term they agreed in only about
half of the cases decided.108
In addition to the inner dynamics of the Court, the nature of the issues
before the Burger Court help to account for the mixed character of the
Court's record. The Warren Court is well remembered for decisions laying
down general principles: Brown, Mapp, Miranda, and Reynolds v. Sims are typi-
cal Warren Court decisions; all of them paint in broad strokes. Reynolds reads
more like an essay in political theory than a judicial opinion.10 9 The Warren
Court was sometimes more comfortable making policy on the grand level than
implementing it. Thus, it was more than a decade after Brown before the
Warren Court began to attend seriously to the need to oversee the work of
the lower courts in desegregation cases. Moreover, many of the major Warren
Court decisions date from the later years of that Court, the high water mark
being the mid-sixties.
The task of implementing much of what the Warren Court began has
fallen, therefore, to the Burger Court. Implementation, by its nature, draws
courts into closer judgment calls. It is the difference between writing the
National Basketball Association's rulebook and, in the fast breaking action of
an actual basketball game, applying those rules. Whereas the Warren Court
wrote many of the rules, the Burger Court finds itself refereeing while the
game continues. Had the Warren Court survived into the seventies, it might
have found implementation as difficult and as splintering as has the Burger
Court.
108. Compare The Statistics, Voting Alignments. Table I (B) (1), The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1, 275 (1974) (Blackmun-Rehnquist: 79.9 percent; Blackmun-Powell: 74.8 percent;
Blackmun-Burger: 84 percent; Burger-Rehnquist: 90.3 percent: Burger-Powell: 80.8 percent;
Powell-Rehnquist: 82.6 percent) with The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 328 (1978)
The Statistics, Voting Alignments, Table I (B) (1) (Blackmun-Rehnquist: 50.4 percent; Blackmun-
Powell: 60.7 percent; Blackmun-Burger: 59.1 percent; Burger-Rehnquist: 75.6 percent; Burger-
Powell: 66.2 percent; Powell-Rehnquist: 55.4 percent).
109. That was the nub of the dissenters' objections to the result-that it prefered one politi-
cal doctrine over another, neither of which were fairly grounded in the Constitution. See 377
U.S. 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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One senses that the justices of the Burger era have perceived the issues of
the seventies as more complex than was true of litigation in the sixties. This
Court may mirror the shift in the mood of the country at large, from the
bold enthusiasm of the Kennedy years to doubt and uncertainty about solu-
tions to social issues in the years after the Great Society, Vietnam, and
Watergate.
Contrasting Brown and Bakke may be instructive. The central question in
Brown, though controversial, was relatively crisp: can state-imposed segrega-
tion by race in public schools be squared with the fourteenth amendment?
By contrast, the issue of affirmative action is, for most people, more clouded,
and as a result persons of sensitive ethical judgment may be found on all sides
of the issue. Small wonder, then, that in contrast to Brown's unanimity (which,
granted, was not that easy to come by in 1954) stands the fragmentation of
the Court in Bakke-six opinions covering 156 pages. Perhaps it is only viewed
in retrospect, and with the country far from where it was in 1954, that Brown
looks more simple than Bakke. Yet it seems relevant that after a period of bold
judicial strokes, Court and country alike might find adjusting boundaries
more comforable than more innovation.
An overview of the Burger Court brings one to the conclusion that this is
a Court in which no one ideology or philosophy prevails on a regular basis. It
is a Court in which competing forces exist side by side. Nixon's appointees
have created a strong force for conservative values. Lessons learned in the six-
ties, however, are not quickly unlearned. Activist techniques, once employed,
are available to be used again. Their use, it should be clear, is not confined to
the "liberals" on the Court. The fluid voting patterns emphasize the competi-
tion between the voices of caution and the neo-Warren bent for action.
What one sees happening in the Burger Court carries echoes of the les-
sons of American constitutional history. There has, for example, been an in-
teresting historical interplay between due process and equal protection. From
the late nineteenth century until 1937, due process, especially in economic
cases, was in the ascendancy; equal protection was quiescent. After 1937, due
process had a bad connotation, at least in economic cases, but the Warren
Court found new uses for equal protection. The Burger Court has put unmis-
takable limits on the "new" equal protection but has nursed the renaissance of
substantive due process. One can mark similar rises and falls in the use of
other clauses, such as the contract clause. 10
One thing that such clauses-due process, equal protection, the contract
clause-have in common is that each can be the tool of an activist judiciary.
Their use raises recurring questions about the proper role of the judiciary in
a democracy and about the proper sources of judicial interpretation. From
110. See Note, Revival of the Contract Clause: Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus and United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 65 VA. L. REv. 377 (1979).
A JUDICIAL NONET
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
the beginning, there has been, in the American constitutional tradition, a dia-
logue between constitutionalism and natural law. Even before the Revolution,
the American colonists, in the tracts and pamphlets they wrote attacking Brit-
ish policies, drew upon more than one source of American rights. The British
Constitution, colonial charters, and natural law were woven together. 1'
This eclecticism became an American habit and an earmark of American
constitutional litigation. Threads that could be used to support one another,
such as appeals to a written constitution and arguments grounded in natural
law, can also be in tension. The forces sometimes reinforce each other, some-
times they compete. Americans (like their English forebears) have typically
been less given to efforts at total integration of constitutional theory on an ab-
stract level than their continental counterparts, such as the French. Like the
common law, American constitutional law takes on this Anglo-American char-
acter of evolution, eclecticism, even a dialectical nature. Americans seem con-
tent to abide a fair degree of contradiction and of ad hoc evolution in their
law. The Burger Court is heir to this tradition.
111. See B. BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1965); A. HOWARD, THE ROAD
FROM RUNNYMEDE 133-202 (1968).
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